We Will Retake America, If Only One Home And One Town At A Time!

[Richard Allan Jenni]

It would be most helpful, I suppose, to come up with a viable plan to retake our country, rather than complaining all the time- or at best, continually stirring the pot. Therefore, here are a few ideas- some of which I’ve put forth before. Here goes- and not in order of their importance:

First, TSA has made air travel distasteful for most, if not all, of us. Therefore, let’s fly ONLY when there is no other way. Sometimes ya just have to go with the flow and ride with the tide- but not always.

Second, gasoline, diesel and energy prices have risen nearly to the point of collapsing our economy. However, supply and demand still have a great effect on national/world markets. Let’s combine our trips, drive less, walk more (and so on) to force prices down. If nothing else, at the end of any given week, we’ll all have a little more money in our pockets (or a little less credit card debt) than we would otherwise.

Third, we must stop our dollars from flying abroad in exchange for foreign goods. Buy only American- which probably means in great measure, don’t buy at all.

Fourth, get out of debt as best you can. Every dollar of interest we eliminate helps starve the international banking cartel- which is apparently bent on starving US.

Fifth, produce as much of your own food as you are able. Learn how to grow your own vegetables, bake your own bread- maybe even raise a few chickens. The Obamanites wish to make us dependent on foreign food. If nothing else, support your local farmer. The Amish, for example, have it right- and that is why they are currently being harassed by the federal government over raw milk and other areas of their local food production.

Sixth, keep the bulk of your money in a safe place other than a bank. Contending with our inflated fiat Federal Reserve currency is bad enough, but THE  ELECTRONIC LEDGER ENTRIES WHICH REPRESENT YOUR FED BUCKS CAN BE SEIZED BY THE OBAMANITES AT WILL.

Seventh, stay informed- and I don’t mean keeping yer eyes and ears glued to FNC or any other arm of the lamestream media. READ, READ AND READ! More importantly, make it your mission to keep OTHERS informed, especially your friends and family members.

Eighth, small local groups are the key to our rebellion- hundreds of thousands of them! Yes, patriot groups like Real Conservatives play an important part, but the Obamanites can shut down the internet anytime they want. For example, organize yourselves in small groups to establish both a common means of defense and a secondary emergency food/water supply.

Ninth, you can see clearly where socialized medicine is headed. Even having expensive health insurance may fail to guarantee you adequate medical care. Learn the rudiments of first aid and those time-tested home remedies. For example, did you know that massive doses of lecithin will dissolve gallstones?

Tenth, go to church- and with full intent! I don’t care what brand of Christianity you and your family might practice- but rest assured only God Almighty will get us out of this mess, “even after all we can do” ourselves.

Eleventh, educate and strengthen your families. Truly, the most important work you will ever do is within the walls of your own home. Teach family members to be self-reliant. Teach them traditional Christian values- especially to pray and work. Teach them to pray as though their success and survival depended solely on God- and to work as if all depended on them. Above all, let there be love in your homes- for genuine affection and understanding are rarely found elsewhere.

Twelfth, magnify your vote by preaching the Conservative message. If you convert just one other person, you have doubled your voting power. Blogging on the internet may enhance, but will never replace, your word of mouth!

Thirteenth, let us enter an age of racial harmony in America. We cannot afford to buy into the racial divisiveness that is being generated by the Obamanites. If for no other reason, black verses white verses brown verses red verses yellow has no place on the battlefield. And make no mistake, we are at war with a tyrannical government- whether you like it or not.

Fourteenth? Well, that’s probably enough for one day, but the old advice to “think globally and act locally” has great importance in retaking America. Supporting one local farmer, for example, will do more for America than a month of Sunday’s spent blogging. And whether it’s simply recycling your aluminum cans and plastic bottles or opting to ride a bicycle to save a little gasoline, every effort we make on the home front adds up. Just like WWII!

These suggestions are certainly no panacea, but I hope they start you thinking. We WILL retake America, if only one home and one town at a time until tyranny has finally breathed its last- and until we at last can again breathe free. May God bless each of you and your beloved families- and may the Almighty ever bless this hallowed land.       

-- 
Richard Allan Jenni

Ocean City, New Jersey
Real Conservatives

[Sandra]

We will win this war against us! Never surrender and never give up!  I ma so sick of zeros class warfare and  other BS... Thanks for the post Allan, a good read as usual..

[Gordon Ray Kissinger]

All endtime events are tied to Israel and the mideast.

(The time of the locusts is May through September).

 

What Are the Palestinians Planning after September?
by Pinhas Inbari
Jerusalem Issues Brief Vol. 11, No. 7 4 July 2011

http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&a...
TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=7797&TTL=What_Are_the_Palestinians_Planning
_after_September?

ïWhat the Palestinians really envisage after September is to exploit a UN
endorsement of statehood to legitimize an escalation of the conflict. After
having the 1967 lines recognized so as to negate the results of the Six-Day
War, they plan to seek recognition of the 1947 partition lines.

ïThere are signs that the long period of quiet since the Second Intifada is
going to end after September or just before it, and that Abbas' Fatah
organization is already preparing for the "Third Intifada." Ahmad Abu
Ruteima, a Hamas activist in Gaza, describes the objective of the Third
Intifada: "The struggle is about the very existence of Israel and not about
the 1967 borders. The defense minister, Ehud Barak, confirmed that the
[Israeli] army is incapable of confronting a human influx from all
directions."

ïThe post-September scenarios discussed in the upper Fatah echelons involve
a return to the struggle. A senior member of the Fatah Revolutionary
Council, Hatem Abd al-Qader, noted that in case Israel obstructs the
Palestinians' political plans, Abbas will step down, the PA will dissolve
itself, and nothing will prevent the Palestinians from returning to the
struggle. And even if elections are held, the new president will come from
the younger generation, abolish the Oslo agreements, and lead the
Palestinians back to the struggle.

ïWhy does the PLO so adamantly refuse any discussion of swaps between the
Palestinian-populated areas in the Israeli Triangle region and the
settlement blocs. The PLO, apparently, wants to leave the
Palestinian-populated areas in Israel as an anchor for pushing Israel back
to the 1947 borders or even further, as the territorial basis for exercising
the right of return into Israel.

ïIn his New York Times article, Abbas was straightforward: "Palestine's
admission to the United Nations would pave the way for the
internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political
one. It would also pave the way for us to pursue claims against Israel at
the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the International Court
of Justice."

The official Palestinian position is that the preferred option is to return
to negotiations, but as long as Israel refuses to confirm the principle of
the 1967 lines with agreed swaps as the basis for a final settlement, the
Palestinians have no alternative but to unilaterally apply to the United
Nations for recognition as a full member state along those borders. In a
speech to a Geneva Initiative conference in May, Palestinian negotiator Dr.
Saeb Erekat strongly emphasized the 1967 lines as the crux of a solution.1

For the most part, the international community is tired of the unending
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the prospect of the United Nations
"ending" it in September by recognizing Palestinian statehood is appealing
to many. Moreover, many in the international community consider a solution
based on the 1967 borders to be fair.

Hence, the PLO's declared policy of seeking UN recognition in September has
gathered international support and encouragement and challenged Israeli
diplomacy as never before. A key point that makes the Palestinian position
so attractive is the simple notion that the future Palestinian state will
suffice with the 1967 borders and immediately engage in peace negotiations
to end the conflict. The tired world is happy to hear that finally a
Palestinian state will come into being and, as a "peace-loving state" - as
required for state membership in the United Nations - will engage in peace
and not in war or conflict.

If that was really the case, and the application for statehood was aimed at
completing peace negotiations on a "state-to-state" footing, this would have
been a reasonable course of action deserving all possible support.2 However,
if one studies the details of what the Palestinians really envisage after
September, serious doubts arise. What they are actually planning is the
opposite: to exploit a UN endorsement of statehood in order to legitimize an
escalation of the conflict while destabilizing the entire Middle East during
a critical period when the region is already agitated.

The Palestinians do not want to declare a state, but, rather, to leave the
conflict open. After having the 1967 lines recognized so as to negate the
results of the Six-Day War, they plan to seek recognition of the 1947
partition lines and thereby end the refugee problem - while attempting to
inflict economic losses on Israel by suing it for "occupation damages,"
suing IDF officers on war crimes charges, causing civil war in Israel over
settler evacuation, and creating strife between Israel and the United States
to the extent of ending their historical special relationship, if possible.

That is what the Palestinians are planning. Can they carry it out? Probably
not;3 the plans are too large and presumptuous for them. Nevertheless, it is
crucial to be aware of this far-reaching scheme.

The 1947 Borders

The most striking phenomenon in the internal Palestinian discourse is the
revival of the 1947 UN partition plan.4 With the PLO declaring that the
September move involves enshrining the 1967 lines, why is so much attention
being given to the 1947 lines?

The answer can be found in PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas' recent New York Times
op-ed.5 Abbas ignited the anger of the Israeli government in what it called
a distortion of history. His description of the 1947 events ran counter to
recorded history as Israel knew it: whereas Abbas claimed that only Israel
received its share of the partition plan, then attacked the Palestinians and
expelled them, Israel recalled the fact that the Palestinians and the Arabs
rejected the plan and attacked Israel, and Palestinians fled the country as
a result of a war their side had initiated.6

Abbas, however, is no historian, and he did not write the article as a
historical thesis but as a statesman who has a claim. His claim is that,
with the United Nations having given Israel its share of the partition plan,
it is now the Palestinians' turn to get their share. Thus, even before the
United Nations has recognized the 1967 lines as borders, the PLO is raising
the claim for the 1947 borders.

Does it make sense? Yes. The Palestinians' answer to the Israeli demand to
be recognized as a Jewish state is that the UN partition plan already
recognized a Jewish state along the borders of 1947.7

Normally, the leaders of new states declare their independence from their
home territory, and only go to the UN in order to obtain UN membership.
Strikingly, Abbas does not want to declare a state in Ramallah, but wants
statehood granted or acknowledged by the UN General Assembly. Once clear
reason for his reluctance to declare a state by himself is so that he does
not commit himself to the 1967 lines, but rather leaves the conflict open,
so that the Palestinian national movement can seek more territories in the
future, starting with the 1947 lines.

The revival of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 and the 1947 borders is
not a new Palestinian strategy. In May 1999, when the PLO argued that the
Oslo Accords were about to expire, Nabil Sha'ath, who was the Palestinian
Minister of International Cooperation, proposed reviving Palestinian claims
to the 1947 lines.8

Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has used the argument that the
Palestinians do not need at present to declare a state since Yasser Arafat
already made such a declaration on November 15, 1988, in Algiers.9 The basis
of Arafat's declaration was Resolution 181. Therefore, from the Palestinian
perspective the borders of 1947 are still a point of reference for future
Palestinian claims.

The Third Intifada

Abbas is well known for strictly rejecting the use of force, and in that
regard he has contributed to the peaceful atmosphere since the Second
Intifada, which was characterized by cruel terror activity within Israel.
However, there are signs that this long period of quiet, for which Abbas
deserves credit, is going to end after September or just before it, and that
his Fatah organization is already preparing for the "Third Intifada."

This intifada is not planned to be a terrorist one as the Palestinians -
including Hamas - have well learned the lessons from the terror they
practiced in the Second Intifada. Instead it is planned to be an "intifada
by peaceful means" of the kind that became very popular in the Arab Spring.
Although the methods will not be terroristic, the aims of this Third
Intifada are by all means terroristic and posit the destruction of Israel as
the final goal.

Although this Third Intifada that is planned for September appears to be a
kind of "spontaneous Facebook event," careful tracking of the leaders of the
initiative reveals that they are mostly Hamas activists. Other promoters of
the endeavor are radical leftist activists in the West Bank. The Fatah
movement, which supposedly should dissent from this campaign as ostensible
supporters of a compromise involving the 1967 lines,10 not only does not
object to it but also is posting the link to the Third Intifada's Facebook
page on some of its home pages, thereby expressing endorsement of the
ominous contents.11

Thus, the Third Intifada is a joint project of all parties in the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the diaspora: Hamas, radical leftists, Fatah,
and even the PA government in Ramallah. The only difference appears to be
that, whereas the actors outside the framework of government responsibility
are outspoken, the governmental circles are more cautious. One cannot
discern any sort of dispute within the Palestinian political body, but,
rather, a consensus.

How do the Palestinians define the aims of the Third Intifada? A leading
figure among the Facebook activists is Ahmad Abu Ruteima, a Hamas activist
in Gaza. As he describes the objective of the Third Intifada: "The struggle
is about the very existence of Israel and not about the 1967 borders. The
defense minister, Ehud Barak, confirmed that the [Israeli] army is incapable
of confronting a human influx from all directions." The Hamas activist is
confident that the Israeli public ("settlers" as he defines them) "cannot
withstand an attrition war" of this kind, and that "the persistence of these
marches [will send a message] that the owners of the land are standing at
the borders, ready to enter at any moment, and Israeli society will be
constantly concerned and the settlers [Israeli public] will face difficult
dilemmas, accompanied by nervous tensions, regarding whether to stay in a
region encircled by enemies or return to live in the places they came
from."12

Senior Fatah figure in Lebanon Munir Maqdah said: "Raising the Palestinian
flag on the borders in the Nakba events is a declaration of all the
Palestinians that the Palestinian state is from the sea to the river...the
third generation [of refugees] is the generation of liberation...and
return."13

Mazin Qumsiya, a member of the radical left in the West Bank, explains what
the term "justice" means with respect to solving the refugee problem:

Palestinian refugees will have the right to return to their homes and lands
and to receive reparation for their suffering as supported by UNGA
resolution 194. Return and self-determination are key pillars of peace based
on justice...all people who live in historic Palestine as well as
Palestinians who will realize their inalienable right of return will have an
effective equality of citizenship and will enjoy fundamental rights and
freedoms as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.14

Qumsiya is a veteran activist in the field of delegitimizing Israel and
recruiting European leftists to the anti-Israeli campaign in the West Bank
and across Europe and the Americas.15 He sees Israel on the western side of
the Green Line as an "apartheid state," and the territory on the eastern
side as "occupied territories." Hence, the aim of the "refugee marches" is
not to have a Palestinian state established on the 1967 lines but to create
a single state on both sides of those lines.16

It is true that the three above-quoted figures represent the extremes of the
Palestinian political spectrum. The problem is that no one in the mainstream
has contradicted them; Fatah websites sanction those views by posting the
link to the Third Intifada Facebook page. Furthermore, the Hamas activist,
Abu Ruteima, has even justified the non-aggressive approach practiced in
Ramallah as "more effective." Hence, Hamas' readiness to adopt this modus
operandi points to a new species which can be called "nonviolent terrorism."

One might have expected that PLO leader Abbas, who is leading the campaign
for the 1967-borders state, would express reservations or even lead the
argument for a compromise based on those borders; but he has not. Instead he
praised the Nakba Day marchers, mourning the dead "whose spilled blood will
not be wasted" as "the right is stronger than time that has passed, and the
will of the people remains and is stronger than the might of the despotic
power [Israel] and occupation."17 Along the same lines, the PA's Waqf
minister, Mahmoud al-Habash, said in the Muqata'a mosque in Ramallah: "The
occupation even 63 years since the Nakba was not able to uproot us from the
land, and we are stronger [in our right] to this holy land...because we are
owners of this land."18

Many believe Abbas is sincere in his quest for peace, and that may indeed be
the case. The Nakba events, however, were a test for his leadership, and he
did not dispute the open, radical calls for Israel's destruction including
from the midst of his own Fatah power base.

For example, Abbas' main rival in Fatah, the hardliner Faruq Qaddumi,
confirmed that "the right of return is many times more important than a
Palestinian state."19 Abbas and Qaddumi have already argued in the past
about leadership and policy; Abbas led the Oslo process while Qaddumi
rejected it. But at this juncture, Abbas kept his silence.

A newly published book in Israel, The Abyss, by the former head of the
Israeli delegation to Qatar, Eli Avidar,20 may provide an answer to this
enigma. The former diplomat recounts that in a meeting between former
Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and the Emir of Qatar, Ben-Ami told the Emir
that Israel had offered to absorb as many as two hundred thousand refugees
within Israel and had even considered accepting double this number under the
rubric of "family reunions" - but the Palestinians had rejected the offer.
One explanation is that the return of a large number of refugees is not the
aim in itself. The aim is not family reunions, but to shrink Israel to the
1947 borders on the clear basis of the right of return, thereby undoing the
results of the 1948 war - after the United Nations undoes the results of the
1967 war in September.

According to a report published in al-Quds al-Arabi about the internal
crisis in Fatah, the Fatah Revolutionary Council has endorsed the "Facebook
intifada";21 that means the Fatah sites' posting of the Third Intifada link
is an official act of the movement. A senior member of the Revolutionary
Council, Hatem Abd al-Qader of east Jerusalem, is quoted as saying that in
case Israel obstructs the political plans, Abbas will step down, general
elections will not take place, the PA will dissolve itself, and nothing will
prevent the Palestinians from returning to the struggle. And even if
elections are held, the new president will come from the younger generation,
abolish the Oslo agreements, and lead the Palestinians back to the struggle..
Either way, then, the post-September scenarios discussed in the upper Fatah
echelons involve a return to the struggle.

Thus, in no way will UN recognition of the 1967 borders mark the path to a
historic compromise. The Palestinians will not exploit this opportunity to
declare a state, but, instead, will use it for international legitimacy to
jumpstart the campaign for the 1947 partition plan.22

There has also been talk in Palestinian circles of reviving UNSCOP, the
committee whose recommendations served as the foundation for the 1947
partition plan.23 Although one might assume that at least a revived UNSCOP
would adjust the 1947 partition borders to reflect the new demographic
reality in Israel, that is not necessarily so.

The issue of the 1947 borders has triggered discussions and symposia in the
Palestinian academic community. In one of the symposia a leading Palestinian
scholar in Israel, Prof. Adel Manna', raised the argument that the 1947
borders did not reflect the demographic reality at the time, allocating to
the Jews much more than their actual share.24

This can also explain why the PLO so adamantly refuses any discussion of
swaps between the Palestinian-populated areas in the Israeli Triangle region
and the settlement blocs. That would be the most reasonable formula for a
border agreement based on the 1967 lines. But the PLO, apparently, wants to
leave the Palestinian-populated areas in Israel as an anchor for pushing
Israel back to the 1947 borders or even further, as the territorial basis
for exercising the right of return into Israel.

Prosecuting Israel in International Tribunals

There is another side to the same coin. Abbas has expressed on several
occasions his firm insistence that not a single Jew or Israeli will remain
in the future Palestinian state, triggering angry Israeli accusations of
racism.25 Again, one may wonder why swaps that are based on the current
demographic reality, as recognized in President Bush's letter to former
Prime Minister Sharon, are so strongly rejected by the PLO?

The answer takes us to another aspect of what the Palestinians are preparing
for after September: causing Israel the greatest possible hardships,
including igniting internal conflicts, inflicting economic disaster, and
dragging IDF officers to international war crimes tribunals.

In his New York Times article, Abbas was straightforward: "Palestine's
admission to the United Nations would pave the way for the
internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political
one. It would also pave the way for us to pursue claims against Israel at
the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the International Court
of Justice."

Actually the PLO has been preparing to pursue such claims for a long time,
well before the current crisis and even during the "serious" negotiations
with the Kadima government. The PLO's Palestinian Monitoring Group of its
Negotiations Affairs Department used to publish almost regularly a "Daily
Situation Report" in which it meticulously recorded all sorts of damage
inflicted by Israel and the settlers on the Palestinians in a variety of
ways: direct damage by soldiers or settlers, checkpoints, the "wall," and so
on. This steady accumulation of data has only one logical function: to be
forwarded in due time to international tribunals in order to sue Israel in a
multibillion-dollar damage claim.

The Maan news agency reported that in the application documents prepared by
the PLO for September, there is also an annex for a Palestinian application
for a seat on the international legal tribunals at The Hague after being
recognized as state.26

Indeed, the PLO needs statehood recognition in order to overcome what has so
far been the major impediment to its outreach to the international
tribunals: not having the status of a state, since only states can appeal to
these courts. Hence, the PLO has needed someone else to plead its case.
Before the Arab Spring, the Arab governments refused to do so; now, in the
midst of it, they are too busy with domestic troubles. The statehood status
that the United Nations will be asked to grant the PLO in September is about
meeting this need, not about establishing a state. What the Palestinians
plan to do then is not to exercise statehood but to declare themselves a
"state under occupation" in order to legitimize the escalation of the
struggle.27

A senior Fatah official, Muhammad Shtiyya, went even further. He told the
Maan news agency in an interview that if Palestine is not accepted by the
UN, the Palestinians will replace the Israeli shekel with the U.S. dollar as
the formal currency in the PA and enlarge the scope of the Palestinian
boycott from settlement products to all Israeli products.28

Suing Israel is, in fact, a separate phenomenon from seeking a statehood
endorsement in September, and the Palestinians will keep doing so with or
without a UN resolution. This can be learned from the recent meeting of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Indonesia at which the
Palestinians finally found someone to file suit for them in case either the
United Nations rejects their application or they decide not to take that
step.29

The PA sent to the OIC meeting a high-ranking delegation led by Foreign
Minister Riyadh al-Malki, as well as Prisoners Minister Issa Qaraqe' and UN
envoy Dr. Riyadh Mansur. With the support of the new Egyptian foreign
minister, Nabil al-Arabi, they succeeded to obtain the OIC's agreement to
file suit for the PA in UN tribunals. The OIC delegate said: "We support
going as far as international law permits in prosecuting Israel for its
breaches."30

* * *

Notes

1. http://heskem.org.il/activity_detail.asp?id=2680&meid=19.

2. Actually some leading Israeli commentators tried to find in the
Palestinian drive a way to extract a positive "win-win" situation.. See Yossi
Alpher, Colette Avital, Shlomo Gazit, and Mark Heller, "Buying into
Palestinian Statehood," New York Times, 24 June 2011;

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/opinion/25iht-edalpher25.html?_r=...
ef=global.

3. Even Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad appears skeptical. See Karin
Laub, "Palestinian PM Skeptical of UN Bid," AP Interview, 28 June 2011;

http://news.yahoo.com/ap-interview-palestinian-pm-skeptical-un-bid-144
859445.html.

4. The formal announcement of the PLO decision to apply for UN recognition
already includes a reference to the 1947 borders. It says that the
application for a "state along 1967 borders...is based on the international
legitimacy specific for Palestine since 1947." Maan News (Arabic), 27 June
2011. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=400141.

5. Mahmoud Abbas, "The Long Overdue Palestinian State," New York Times, 16
May 2011;

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html.

6. "PM Netanyahu Responds to PA Pres. Abbas' Article in the New York Times,"
Israel Prime Minister's Office, 17 May 2011;
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/Spokesman/2011/05/spoketguv
a170511.htm.
See also Shlomo Avineri, "The Truth Should Be Taught about the 1948 War,"
Ha'aretz, 17 June 2011;
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-truth-should-be-taugh
t-about-the-1948-war-1.368167.

7. According to a senior Palestinian source in a private conversation, this
was Abbas' position when he met with Prime Minister Netanyahu behind closed
doors in Washington on 2 September 2010.

8. Al-Ayyam, April 23, 1999; MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 31, April 23, 1999.
See also Letter of Nasser al-Kidwa, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the
UN, to the United Nations, 25 March 1999:

Moreover, we believe that Israel must still explain to the international
community the measures it took illegally to extend its laws and regulations
to the territory it occupied in the war of 1948, beyond the territory
allocated to the Jewish state in Resolution 181 (II). Such a situation has
not been accepted by the international community.

9. "A Palestinian State in Two Years: Interview with Salam Fayyad,
Palestinian Prime Minister," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. xxxix, no. 1
(Autumn
2009):58-74.http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/10540.pdf.

10. The Palestinians used to make a distinction between the PLO as the actor
that negotiates with Israel, and Fatah as "only" a party that has its own
separate agenda. However, Saeb Erekat, who is the chief PLO negotiator and a
Fatah Central Committee member, did not make this distinction in the Geneva
Initiative meeting and spoke of "Fatah positions" as adhering to a
1967-borders solution. See note 1.

11. http://www.palpress.co.uk/arabic/.

12. http://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=810197.

13. Maan, 2 May 2011,
http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=389516.

14. Mazin Qumsiya, Human Rights Newsletter, 12 October 2010.

15.
http://www.palestinejn.org/component/content/article/47-ongoing/124...

16. Ibid.

17. http://www.palpress.co.uk/arabic/?action=detail&id=6897.

18. http://www.alaahd.com/arabic/?action=detail&id=69311.

19. http://www.almustaqbal-a.com/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=13112&Type=9.

20. Eli Avidar, The Abyss (Tel Aviv: Agam, 2011).

21. "Walid Awad: Fatah Faces Crisis in Choosing Its Candidate for Next
Presidential Elections on the Backdrop of Abbas's Resolve Not to Run,"
al-Quds al-Arabi, 13 May 11.

22. BBC in Arabic quoted a Palestinian senior official saying: "There is a
mistaken language used...as if we want to declare a state in a surprising
way. We shall not do this...we want to join the club of nations...and then
to [enter] the international accountability circles" - which means that they
will demand accountability from Israel in international tribunals. 24 June
2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/mobile/middleeast/2011/06/110624_statehood
_palestinian.shtml.

23. Jerome Segal, "Palestinian Unilateralism: Step-2 and Israeli Strategy,"
Ha'aretz, 27 May 2011.

24.
http://alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today\17x84.htm&arc=data\2011\06\0
6-17\17x84.htm;

http://jadal.mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/Jadal_PDF_2011/jadal10-a
rb/adel-manaa-jadal10-arb.pdf.

25. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4004200,00.html;

http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?ID=222771&am...

26. 16 June 2011, http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=397302.

27. The full plan prepared by Erekat for application refers to the new
status as "state under occupation."
http://www.almustaqbal-a.com/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=13105&Type=9;

28. 27 June 2011, http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=400139.

29. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=393073.

30. Ibid.

* * *

Pinhas Inbari is a senior policy analyst at the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs. He is also a veteran Palestinian affairs correspondent who formerly
reported for Israel Radio and Al Hamishmar newspaper, and currently reports
for several foreign media outlets. He is the author of a number of books on
the Palestinians including The Palestinians: Between Terrorism and
Statehood.